Following Assad's Tenure, potential for Ex-Jihadist Organization Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham to Govern Syria?
Following Assad's Tenure, potential for Ex-Jihadist Organization Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham to Govern Syria?
Damascus yields to the regime's diminished resistance, marking an understated conclusion to its history. At times, history concludes with a soft surrender rather than a dramatic finale. Syria finds itself at a pivotal juncture. For decades, the Assad administration maintained its grip on power, with significant support from Russian airstrikes and Iranian proxies. Yet, this seemingly invincible regime seems to be crumbling, not with the deafening sound of artillery, but with a hint of resignation. Once-impregnable Damascus, after half a century under the Assad family's control, now ventures under the authority of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). This group, once associated with al-Qaeda and labeled as a terrorist organization by Washington, Brussels, and the UN, has emerged from the ashes of global extremism, claiming dominion over Syria. Recently, such a transformation appeared implausible.
Transitions from insurgency to governance seldom follow a linear path—a truth I discovered through my doctoral research on Syrian rebel governance and my experience as a BBC journalist and researcher at SWP Berlin. In Idlib, HTS's Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) proved itself an efficient administrator, providing electricity, sanitation, and bread to war-weary civilians. These accomplishments demonstrated a capacity for governance beyond the battlefield, hinting at a practical shift. However, what succeeds in one Syrian corner—a controlled environment with a homogeneous populace—may not be applicable to a nation of 18 million people, half of whom are displaced and divided along sectarian, ethnic, and political lines. Syria is not a tabula rasa. A Christian priest can still conduct services in Aleppo; Kurds enjoy a degree of autonomy in the northeast; and the memories of ISIS atrocities and Assad's prisons have left the national psyche fragmented.
Managing a single province is distinct from ruling a nation. My fieldwork revealed three significant challenges for any faction assuming the mantle of Damascus. First is legitimacy: governing Idlib entailed restoring basic services like electricity and bread distribution, but governing Damascus necessitates a much more complex bureaucracy. Within days of occupying Aleppo, HTS dispatched teams to address infrastructure and maintain order, nonetheless, managing a diverse populace and central institutions demands constitutional safeguards, trust in the judiciary, and protection for minorities. Second is international recognition: Jolani vehemently denounces the "terrorist" label, claiming that these classifications are "political and false." However, foreign governments, investors, and NGOs are hesitant to engage deeply with a group that once advocated for armed jihad. Words alone can't erase lingering fears. Third is internal opposition: HTS once imposed order with an iron fist, imprisoning and torturing dissidents. Now, it must tolerate dissent, ensuring that its gestures towards liberalization—such as permitting unveiled women and supporting Christian worship—translate into genuine structural reforms rather than artificial appearances.
Over the past weeks, HTS has swept through Aleppo, Hama, and Homs with unexpected ease as Assad's forces have dissipated. Russia and Iran, once unwavering allies, now seem to have lost interest in propping up a faltering ship. Arab states that, in half-hearted support of Assad's return to diplomatic circles, now hurry to devise a coherent response. While Western governments question the authenticity of HTS's transformation, global consultancies and sovereign funds remain wary. The strategic and economic importance of the region as a hub for trade corridors and energy routes lingers in the background, but investing in a nation governed by a leader with a $10 million bounty on his head remains questionable.
Jolani's rhetorical evolution is unmistakable: “We are engaged in a form of governance consistent with this region’s traditions,” he declares, asserting that “no one has the right to disregard another group.” Allowing women to go unveiled and permitting Christians to conduct services without interference—these indicate a newfound pragmatism. However, the chasm between image and institution is substantial. To expand the relative stability achieved in Idlib to an entire nation, HTS must integrate rival factions, uphold religious and ethnic diversity, and grant local communities sway over their own affairs. Without genuine power-sharing, it risks recreating the oppressive regime it claims to replace.
Drawing Parallels between HTS and SDF/FSA: Lessons from Fieldwork
Past examples offer insights and warnings. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces built an effective local order with US backing, but neither aspired to govern all of Syria. The Turkey-backed Syrian National Army struggled with division and corruption. ISIS's so-called caliphate recognized only force. HTS's hybrid approach, combining ideology and technical competence, maintained control over Idlib, but can it navigate a much more convoluted landscape without reprising its violent practices? If it manages to draft a constitution that protects minorities, dismantle its mechanisms of terror, and secure some reluctant endorsements, it might pave the way for reconstruction agreements and the return of refugees.
The implications transcend Syria's borders. If HTS delivers stability and fairness, the displaced Syrians in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and even some in Europe might choose to return. Reconstruction, trade, and infrastructure projects could redefine the region's economy. However, if oppression and revenge define this new order, another exodus and fresh cycles of violence await. As foreign governments weigh their reactions, they recall how often insurgent leaders have pledged tolerance, only to retreat into cruelty once they grasp power.
At the end of the road, the path for HTS is narrow and steep. HTS needs to move past its insurgent past, building genuine trust with Syrians and the global community. If it can overcome three crucial hurdles—establishing credibility through inclusive leadership, obtaining international recognition through visible reforms, and managing internal dissent by showing genuine acceptance and accountability—it might evolve from an armed group into a significant player in Syria's future. If it stumbles, it will only add another dismal episode to a country that has already known too much betrayal and despair.
The story is still being written, but the ink is yet to dry. Governments, investors, diplomats, spies, and humanitarians are all keeping a close eye. Neighbors, from Turkey to Israel, from the Gulf states to Europe, are all quietly rethinking their plans. The question now is if Syria's next act will be directed by a group once ruled by ideology and terror, or if it will be led by a reformed entity capable of managing a wounded nation back from the brink.
Syria's destiny teeters on the edge. The situation isn't one of ideal choices, but of feasible ones. As Syria's streets are filled with workers instead of fighters, we're witnessing the creation of a new Syrian state or the preamble to its next turmoil.
The Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), a part of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has shown competence in providing essential services in Idlib, indicating a capability for governance beyond the battlefield. However, this might not be easily translated to governing the nation-state of Syria, given its complex demographics and political division.
The Syrian Salvation Government, under the leadership of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, aims to transition from an insurgent group to a significant player in Syria's post-Assad future. To accomplish this, they must overcome hurdles such as establishing credibility through inclusive leadership, obtaining international recognition through visible reforms, and managing internal dissent by showing genuine acceptance and accountability.